The institution of prescription, regulated by the Civil Code, represents a mechanism for the extinguishment of rights due to their non-exercise by the holder for a period of time determined by law. Ratio The purpose of this institution lies in the need for certainty in legal relationships. However, the passage of time can be halted by events that manifest the holder's intention to exercise their right or by the acknowledgement of the right itself by the obligated party. These events lead to the interruption of prescription.
1. Acts Interrupting the Statute of Limitations: Types and Effects
The interruption of the statute of limitations occurs as a result of specific acts or behaviours provided for by law, which have the effect of cancelling the time already elapsed and starting a new period of limitation. The causes of interruption are strictly indicated in Articles 2943 and 2944 of the Civil Code and are mainly divided into acts of exercise of the right by the holder and acts of recognition of the right by the debtor.
1.1. The fundamental distinction: instantaneous effect and permanent effect
A crucial distinction, highlighted by case law, is that between interruptive acts with an instantaneous effect and those with a permanent effect (Cass. Civ., Sez. 3, N. 18948 of 16-07-2019).
- Instant EffectThis is typical of out-of-court proceedings, such as a formal notice to pay (Article 2943, paragraph 4, Italian Civil Code) and the acknowledgment of debt (Article 2944, Italian Civil Code). Following such acts, the limitation period is interrupted, and a new limitation period, identical to the previous one, begins to run from the day after the interrupting act. As stated by the Court of Cassation, “as a result of the interruption, a new limitation period begins” (Cass. Civ., Section 3, No. 18948 of 16-07-2019).
- Permanent Effect: it is brought about by a legal claim and acts deemed equivalent to it (Article 2943, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Civil Code). In this case, the interruptive effect not only resets the time that has elapsed but also prevents the limitation period from running for the entire duration of the proceedings, until the judgment concluding the case becomes final (Article 2945(2) of the Civil Code). The aim is to “prevent the protracted nature of the proceedings from being to the detriment of the party who must rely on the proceedings to demonstrate the validity of their case” (Civil Court of Cassation, Section 3, No. 18948 of 16 July 2019).
1.2. Extrajudicial proceedings: formal notice to pay
Article 2943, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code establishes that prescription is interrupted by “any other act that serves to put the debtor in default”. For an out-of-court act to have an interrupting effect, case law requires the presence of specific requirements. The act must contain:
- A subjective element: a clear indication of the party against whom the order is made (Prato District Court – Judgment No. 607 of 10 November 2025; Rovigo District Court – Judgment No. 199 of 27 August 2025).
- An objective element: the formalisation of a claim and a written demand or request for performance that unequivocally expresses the claimant’s intention to enforce their right (Court of Cassation, Civil Section 6, No. 21154 of 2 October 2020).
No formal wording is required (Court of Cassation, Civil Section 6, No. 21154 of 2 October 2020), as it is sufficient for the document to express, even implicitly, the intention to exercise the right. However, the act must be capable of being received, that is to say, it must be brought to the attention of the addressee in order to take effect (Court of Milan – Judgment No. 5235 of 25 June 2025, Court of Santa Maria Capua Vetere, Judgment No. 74 of 8 January 2024). A series of acts occurring in succession cannot be assessed collectively to infer an interrupting effect if each individual act is not in itself sufficient to put the debtor in default (Court of Cassation, Civil Section 3, No. 18948 of 16 July 2019).
2. The judicial claim and other procedural acts
2.1. The permanent interrupting effect of judicial demand
The notification of the writ by which a proceeding (of cognition, interim protection or enforcement) is commenced, and the claim made during a proceeding already initiated, are the principal causes of interruption with permanent effect (Cass. Civ., Sec. 5, No. 13110 of 07-05-2026). Article 2945, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code states:
If the interruption occurred by means of one of the acts indicated in the first two paragraphs of Article 2943, the statute of limitations shall not run until the judgment with which the proceedings are concluded becomes final.
This means that, for the entire duration of the proceedings, the creditor’s claim is protected from being time-barred.
2.2. The interruptive effect of the creditor’s “defensive” acts
An interesting development in case law concerns the effect of procedural documents, by which a creditor, when sued by the debtor, merely defends themselves, in interrupting the limitation period. The Court of Cassation has progressively recognised that such documents also have a permanent interrupting effect. In particular, in proceedings seeking a declaration that no debt exists, the mere request by the defendant creditor to dismiss the opposing claim was deemed sufficient to interrupt the limitation period, as it implicitly reaffirms the creditor’s claim (Court of Cassation, Civil Section 6, No. 21154 of 2 October 2020). This principle has also been extended to other scenarios, such as opposition to a writ of execution or an injunction, where the opposing creditor’s defence in court produces the permanent effects referred to in Article 2945(2) of the Civil Code. (Civil Court of Cassation, Section 6, No. 21154 of 2 October 2020; Court of Cosenza, Judgment No. 536 of 17 March 2025). The Court clarified:
The defendant's request for a mere dismissal of the other party's claim for a negative declaration of a debt can constitute a claim suitable for interrupting the statute of limitations of the right asserted against the debtor, pursuant to Article 2943, paragraph 2, of the Italian Civil Code, if it is aimed, in concreto, at reiterating the reasons for one's own credit and seeking its judicial ascertainment.
2.3. Invalidity of service, discontinuance of proceedings and inadmissible claim: consequences for the limitation period
- Invalidity of serviceThe United Sections of the Court of Cassation, with a recent and important ruling, have established that even a void notification of a judicial act can interrupt prescription, provided that the nullity is rectified. ex tunc by way of renewal, and unless the addressee can prove that the notifier was at fault for the original failure to effect service (Civil Court of Cassation, Joint Divisions, No. 6474 of 18 March 2026).
- Process extinction: if the proceedings are discontinued, the permanent effect of the interruption ceases. However, the document instituting the proceedings retains an immediate interruptive effect. Consequently, a new limitation period begins to run from the date of the act interrupting the limitation period (e.g. service of the writ of summons) (Prato District Court – Judgment No. 607 of 10 November 2025).
- Inadmissible application: even a legal claim that has been declared inadmissible is sufficient to interrupt the limitation period, as it nevertheless demonstrates the creditor’s intention to exercise their right (Court of Cassation, Civil Section 5, No. 13110 of 7 May 2026).
2.4. The specific case of a civil claim in criminal proceedings
Bringing a civil claim in criminal proceedings may interrupt the limitation period for the right to compensation for damages, but only under specific conditions. Case law emphasises the independence of the civil and criminal legal systems with regard to limitation periods. If the civil claim is declared to have been lodged too late and is therefore inadmissible, it has no effect in interrupting the limitation period, not even ex tunc. The burden of proving the timely formation of a civil party rests on the injured party wishing to avail themselves of the interruption.
3. Termination by recognition of the right
Article 2944 of the Civil Code provides for a further ground for interruption: “the limitation period is interrupted by the acknowledgement of the right by the person against whom that right may be asserted”. Such acknowledgement does not require any specific form and may also be demonstrated through conclusive conduct on the part of the debtor, from which it can be inferred that they are aware of the existence of the debt. A significant example provided by case law concerns the warranty against defects in a sale: the seller’s undertaking to remedy defects in the goods constitutes an “acknowledgement of the debt, which interrupts the limitation period (Article 2944 of the Civil Code)” (Civil Court of Cassation, Section 2, No. 33380 of 30 November 2023).
4. The Statute of Limitations in the Context of Administrative and Criminal Penalties
4.1. Administrative sanctions: typical acts and the intervention of the Constitutional Court
With regard to administrative penalties, case law has clarified that every step in the procedure for establishing the infringement and imposing the penalty constitutes the exercise of the right to impose a penalty and therefore has the effect of immediately interrupting the limitation period (Court of Milan – Judgment No. 5235 of 25 June 2025, Court of Modena, Judgment No. 1296 of 21 August 2024, Court of Modena, Judgment No. 475 of 22 February 2024). Such acts include the service of the assessment report and the enforcement order. Of fundamental importance is Judgment No. 260 of 2021 of the Constitutional Court, which declared the constitutional illegitimacy of a provision (Article 18(5) of Legislative Decree No. 101/2018) which provided for an interruption by law the limitation period solely on the grounds that disciplinary proceedings are pending (Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 260 of 29 December 2021). The Court emphasised that the interruption is based on the cessation of inaction on the part of the right holder or on the debtor’s acknowledgement, principles which are antithetical to the mere inaction of the administration.
4.2. Autonomy between civil and criminal interruption
As already mentioned, the grounds for interruption provided for in the Criminal Code (Article 160 of the Criminal Code) do not automatically apply to the limitation period for the right to compensation for damage arising from a criminal offence, which remains governed by civil law. Except where reference is made to the longer limitation period applicable to the offence (Article 2947(3) of the Civil Code), the two legal regimes operate independently and there is no possibility of them being mutually integrated.
Conclusions
The interruption of the limitation period is a complex legal concept, the practical application of which is constantly being refined by case law. Recent rulings by the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court have provided essential clarifications, in particular regarding the interruptive effect of the creditor’s defensive actions and the requirement that the interruption must stem from an actual expression of intent rather than mere inaction. The distinction between immediate effect and permanent effect remains the cornerstone of the system, with decisive consequences for the protection of rights over time.
